Tag: Online privacy

The Current Debate on the UK Digital ID (“BritCard”) is Misleading – Here’s Why!

nielharper

The current negative debate about the BritCard is misleading because it largely relies on outdated assumptions about technology and centralization, ignoring the fundamental privacy safeguards that several countries have proven work effectively. The central flaw in the critical narrative is that it assumes a 21st-century digital ID is equivalent to the 1950s physical paper card or a single, insecure database. As with any technology, there are pros and cons to digital ID, but to act like it’s mass surveillance or gratuitous privacy violating is just wrong. What’s even more concerning to me is that a lot of the misinformation is being peddled by “privacy experts”.

Progressive countries like Singapore, Belgium, Austria, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Australia, Poland, Netherlands, UAE, and Germany all have digital ID systems. Digital ID facilitates streamlined access to services, increased efficiency, financial inclusion, reduced fraud, and enhanced security. Regarding privacy, they actually allow for contextual data sharing, which privacy experts have asked for repeatedly.

Data protection legislation and digital identity legislation have been coupled together in many countries to establish standards for security, user consent, data protection, and independent regulation. Moreover, privacy and security controls like zero knowledge protocol, unique ID verification, secure storage, data minimization, decentralized data exchange, and biometric safeguards, among others are employed to protect the privacy of individuals.

I have digital IDs for Denmark, Estonia, and Germany, and they are nothing like what these negative arguments suggest.

NOTE: The proposed central use case for the BritCard of combating illegal immigration is ill conceived and distorts the debate around the pros and cons of digital ID.

He Said Security / She Said Privacy Podcast – ISACA 2025 State of Privacy Survey Findings

nielharper

I thoroughly enjoyed tag teaming with Safia Kazi to discuss the key findings of the ISACA State of Privacy Survey with Jodi Daniels and Justin Daniels on the ‘He Said Security / She Said Privacy’ podcast.

We touched on some important topics such as:

  • How companies are handling privacy staffing shortages
  • The growing demand for technical privacy expertise and how privacy pros can adapt
  • AI’s role in transforming privacy operations and its risks
  • The impact of shrinking privacy budgets
  • How board-level buy-in impacts company-wide privacy programs
  • Why privacy by design remains a challenge for many organizations
  • Safia’s and my personal privacy tips

Check out the podcast and let us know what you think!

Security Magazine Top Cybersecurity Leaders for 2025

nielharper

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Security Magazine for recognizing me as one of the Top Cybersecurity Leaders for 2025.

I have always been a fan of Security Magazine and their laser focus on providing information and solutions on risk management, cybersecurity, physical security & safety, and other related industry trends. So this recognition from them is particularly appreciated.

Heartiest congratulations to my good friend Jason Lau and the other awardees Anmol Agarwal, Jay Gonzales, Sandra Cavazos, and David Baker – Your commitment to digital trust and your service to the profession are mighty!

Many thanks as well go out to the amazing teams I have led at INTERPOL, Doodle, and other companies. You are the real champions!

New ISACA Research: 63 Percent of Privacy Professionals Find Their Jobs More Stressful Now Than Five Years Ago

nielharper

The ISACA State of Privacy 2025 survey report, which gathered responses from over 1,600 privacy professionals globally, revealed that 63% of these professionals find their roles more stressful than they were five years ago, with 34% reporting a significant increase in stress levels. The primary sources of stress identified in the survey were the rapid pace of technological advancements (63%), difficulties with compliance (61%), and a lack of resources (59%).

“In an increasingly complex international regulatory environment, often with lacklustre resources, it is understandable that many privacy professionals are feeling strain from their efforts to stay compliant and keep their organizations’ data safe. Addressing these challenges and getting practitioners the support they need will be vital to not only ensure a healthy privacy workforce, but also to maintain data integrity and security, and avoid potential harm to data subjects.” I made these comments via BusinessWire on the report to emphasize not only the challenges associated with implementing privacy programs, but also the importance of organizations demonstrating their commitment to data governance, data ethics, privacy rights, and overall digital trust.

With AI, the privacy landscape has changed dramatically, including the regulatory burdens for companies. Continued leadership in the boardroom, at the executive level, as well as embedding privacy principles in organizational values is integral to nurturing the trust relationship between enterprises, their customers, and society at large.

Comments on the Barbados Cybercrime Bill (2023)

nielharper

PART II – PROHIBITED CONDUCT

Illegal access

Part II (4) (1-2) is far too broad in its scope and can implicate innocent or well meaning individuals such as cybersecurity professionals, researchers, activists, and whistleblowers. It’s even more problematic where judicial officers aren’t trained to understand how to distinguish criminality from activities that serve the public interest, protect organizations, or advance the cybersecurity profession.* Certain guidance should be included with the legislation to distinguish between acceptable and criminal behaviours.

For example, the European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) includes 172 recitals – also known as preamble – that provides context and explains the reasons for the regulations. There was also an explanatory memorandum that provided further details on the proposed legislation.

Misuse of devices

Part II (9) (a-b) There are a number of dual use programmes and applications which can be and are used for both legitimate testing and protection of computer systems and conversely for malicious intent. There should be language here which acknowledges such and removes criminality in cases of ethical hacking for instance.

Disclosure of access codes

Part II (11) (1) There are several legitimate reasons for sharing access codes or credentials without authority, and this alone should not be illegal. The qualifier for criminality should be when the individual knowingly or has reason to believe that it is likely to cause loss, damage or injury to any person or property.

Critical information infrastructure system

Part II (12) (1) The list of critical information infrastructure (CII) systems is too limited in scope. A broader list should be published as an appendix or guidance note when the act is proclaimed (e.g., financial services, water utility, transportation, healthcare, hospitality, etc.). This should not be vague or left up to interpretation.

Note: Complementary critical infrastructure (CI) protection legislation is needed to ensure that:

  • There is a legal framework or a mechanism to identify operators of critical information infrastructure.
  • Operators of critical (information) infrastructure are required to assess and manage cyber risks and/or implement cybersecurity measures.
  • Public sector organizations are required to assess and manage cyber risks and/or implement cybersecurity measures.
  • A competent authority has been designated and allocated powers to supervise the implementation of cyber/information security measures.

Malicious communications

Part II (19) (3) This is deeply problematic and can be used to stifle freedom of expression or valuable public commentary. It can also be leveraged to prevent criticisms of politicians/public personalities or for the purpose of political persecution. This same vague language exists in the Computer Misuse Act 2005, and has been improperly used for the same abuses identified. There must be safeguards and/or independent supervision in place to ensure that such vague clauses are not abused. This applies to several other elements of this Bill.**

Cyber bullying

Part II (20) (1) – Same as the previous comment.

Cyber terrorism

Part II (21) (1-2) This is too limited in scope and should include any use of computer systems for terrorism or organized crime. It should also include preparatory acts for terrorism or organized crimes (these are not the crimes themselves but the precipitating actions).

PART III – INVESTIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Search and seizure

Part III (23) (1-2) gives law enforcement excessively broad powers when it comes to confiscation and access to computer systems (including smaller form factors such as tablets and mobile phones). These types of powers require independent and effective oversight functions (as does this entire Act).

Assisting a police officer

Part III (24) (1-5) Some of the provisions in this section are concerning and can be used to force individuals to grant access to their personal devices, especially in the event that the grounds for disclosure have not been met. Again, this requires independent and effective oversight functions, and the oath of a police officer shouldn’t be enough to obtain a warrant that grants such far reaching powers.

Production of data for criminal proceedings

Part III (26) (1) This gives law enforcement excessively broad and intrusive surveillance powers when it comes to intercepting Internet communications, compelling service providers to handover subscriber data and Internet activity, and other potentially disproportionate collection or interception of online communications. These types of powers require independent and effective oversight functions. Again, the oath of a police officer shouldn’t be enough to obtain a warrant that allows for such intrusive acts.

Preservation of data for criminal proceedings

Part III (28) (1-3) There is no discussion of the conditions and safeguards for adequate protection of human rights and liberties when collecting and storing (preservation) data for criminal proceedings. This includes maintaining the “chain of custody”, protection of personal data in line with the Data Protection Act, handling of sensitive data, retention periods, adequate security measures, automated decisions (e.g., use of AI), sharing personal or sensitive data with third-parties, records of how data is accessed and used, etc. The provisions should also include judicial or other independent supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the duration of such power or procedure.

General observations – Part III

Part III (Investigation and enforcement) is missing key provisions related to:

  • Joint investigations or joint investigation teams
  • Expert witness testimony by video conferencing
  • Emergency mutual assistance (which is different to expedited disclosure)

ALIGNMENT WITH THE BUDAPEST CONVENTION

2nd Protocol of the Budapest Convention

It is clear that the Cybercrime Bill was patterned after the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Budapest Convention, which has been deemed as outdated or deficient for several reasons. The Additional Protocol and the Second Additional Protocol of the Budapest Convention treat additional issues around racism, xenophobia, enhanced cooperation, and access to electronic evidence (e-evidence). The drafters of this Bill do not appear to have integrated the substantive updates from the additional protocols or consider the protections and safeguards required by the Budapest Convention to protect human rights. So it looks like the government is essentially looking to enact legislation that is outdated and not in step with current technology developments or evolving jurisprudence.

* Training of judicial officers, especially with regards to technology law and privacy law, is a major problem in the country. Because these specialist areas of law are emerging, there is poor understanding of the issues by magistrates, judges, prosecutors, etc. and limited case law to refer to locally or in other regional jurisdictions. Consequently, many rulings / decisions have flawed bases, and individuals are often under- or over-penalised.

** The Budapest Convention, on which the Cybercrime Bill is based has an accompanying 60-page explanatory report that specifies the additional checks and balances and rule of law-based environment that countries like Barbados should have underpinning their cybercrime legislation. The explanatory report also covers the background, scope, objectives, and main provisions of the Convention, as well as the challenges and opportunities of cybercrime.

The current version of the Cybercrime Bill (2023) can be found here: https://bit.ly/3uLrSQC

UPDATE: On 6 May 2024, I presented a more detailed critique of the Cybercrime Bill to the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee. The presentation can be found HERE.

Digital ID Explained: Pros, Cons, and “Should I get the Trident ID card?”

nielharper

PURPOSE

I continue to receive countless questions from various walks of Bajan society about the Trident ID card and the national digital ID program. This is stark evidence that the Government of Barbados HAS NOT done an adequate and effective job of alleviating the concerns of the public. As such, I wanted to clarify once and for all the pros and cons of digital ID systems, and answer the million dollar question I am repeatedly asked, “Should I get the Trident ID card?”

INTRODUCTION

Digital identity (ID) has become the topic of the moment in Barbados, given the government’s poor implementation, failure to address the fears and anxieties of the public, and generally ineffectual communication to the average person on the street as to why they need digital ID and what value it will bring to their lives. The government has set out to provide a single digital identity to all residents/citizens through the collection, storage, and use of their biographic data (e.g., name, address, date of birth, gender, national registration number, etc.) and possibly their biometrics (e.g., fingerprints, iris scans, facial scans, etc.) as the primary means of establishing and verifying their identity. They will achieve this through a legally mandated, centralised national digital ID system.

Governments, international organizations, and multilateral banks (e.g., International Monetary Fund, World Bank, etc.) argue that digital ID systems provide benefits such as more effective and efficient delivery of government services; poverty reduction and welfare programs; financial inclusion through better access to banking and other products/services; minimise corruption; and preservation of national security interests. Multilateral banks are providing significant funding to developing countries to implement digital ID. In some cases, they’re even making the implementation of digital ID systems a ‘condition’ of loan agreements.

Critics maintain that digital ID systems may actually not guarantee more effective access to social and economic benefits, enhance service delivery, or improve governance, while at the same time, they raise serious issues, including worries about how they are developed and managed; social exclusion and discrimination; privacy and data protection; cybersecurity; and major risks for human rights. With regards to human rights, they threaten the right to privacy, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and other protected rights. Additionally, since they usually involve the creation and maintenance of centralised databases of sensitive personal data, they are also prone to breaches by hackers or abuse/misuse by government institutions. These issues may lead to digital IDs becoming widespread tools for identification, surveillance, persecution, discrimination, and control, especially where identities are linked to biometrics and made mandatory. 

For a more detailed explanation of both sides of the debate, please see below the PROS and CONS related to digital ID systems.

PROS

Easier access to services: digital ID systems can enable more efficient digital transformation across the local economy and increase Barbados’  participation in the global digital economy, especially given that many transactions – local and international – require personal identification. With Barbadians presented with less obstacles to prove their identity, commercial activities (including e-commerce) and government services (including e-government) become more accessible and effective.

Faster and cheaper transactions: the use of digital ID can allow for reductions in costs and response times, resulting in speedier execution, less red tape, and the availability of more responsive and relevant services. The quickness and trust with which a person’s identification can be verified allows for cheaper and more efficient interactions for all involved.

Fraud reduction: digital ID systems can offer several benefits in terms of online security, thus reducing the occurrence of online scams, fraud, and personal data breaches. A number of countries that have implemented digital ID have experienced significant decreases in fraud, saving them tens and even hundreds of millions of dollars.

The graphic below outlines several ways in which digital ID can be used based on the roles played by organizations and individuals (Source: McKinsey).

The four (4) main areas of direct economic value for individuals have been identified as increased access to financial services, improved employment opportunities, greater agricultural productivity, and time savings. The five (5) highest sources of value for institutions – both the private and public sectors – are cost savings, fraud prevention, increased revenues from goods and services, improved employee productivity, and higher tax revenues.

CONS

Privacy and security: digital ID systems process billions of data points of our private information, regularly without our consent or knowledge. This information can include biographic details (NGN, date of birth, gender), biometrics (facial recognition, iris scans, fingerprints), banking and transactional data, and location-based info when digital ID is used for example in public transportation (the government has expressed plans to use the Trident ID for cashless payments on buses). The centralisation of so much data, excessive sharing of personal data without user consent, inability to control your personal data, exposure to cyber attacks and data breaches, and in worst case scenarios – mass surveillance by corporations and governments – are all issues which show the potential negative impact of digital ID.

Discrimination, biases and exclusion: the Barbados Digital Identity Act has a number of clauses which generate concerns about discrimination and exclusion. The Act states in several places that the digital ID will be required for persons to be added to the register of voters, to vote in elections, to access public and private services, and to obtain a driver’s license. There are no provisions in the Act for mandatory accessibility features in the digital ID and related services. As such, persons with disabilities may be excluded (e.g., the Trident ID website currently DOES NOT have several accessibility features for the disabled). Digital ID technologies are also at the end of the day developed by humans, and through poorly designed algorithms and data analytics, can reinforce their biases. Discrimination against key communities such as immigrants, LGBTQ+, homeless, and the disabled, among others have been highlighted in many digital ID related studies globally.

Technical errors: unintended consequences can occur that lead to restricted access to critical services (e.g., failures in authentication at points of service with no redundancy; websites that aren’t user friendly or stable; duplicate or inaccurate records; inability to add essential information; or the lack of reliable technical support, etc.). The government must fully consider availability risks and identify user-centric and privacy-enabling solutions to mitigate them. In African and Asian countries, numerous instances of technical errors were uncovered which presented citizens with major challenges.

Deployment challenges: five key problems exist, which are the lack of funding to maintain secure cyber systems and to hire or retain critical human resources to administer them; unequal access to mobile Internet and smartphones – the technology with the most potential to drive the uptake of digital ID; dependency on a specific technology or vendor; low trust in government; and the difficulty of rolling out in rural areas.

SHOULD YOU GET THE TRIDENT ID CARD?

As I have stated before, my concern is not particularly with the Trident ID card. The card is only one small piece of the overall digital ID ecosystem. My biggest concerns are as follows:

Poor legislation underpinning the digital ID system: Digital ID must be supported by a legal and regulatory framework that supports trust in the system, prevents abuse such as warrantless and disproportionate surveillance, guarantees data privacy and security, prevents discrimination, and maintains provider (government and corporations) accountability. This includes laws for digital ID management along with laws and regulations for e-government, privacy and data protection, computer misuse, data sovereignty/localisation, electronic transactions, limited-purpose ID systems, accreditation of participants, and freedom of information, among others. Unfortunately, a number of these laws are not available in Barbados at this time, and where they are, the language is problematic, enforcement is deeply lacking, or the legislation is outdated.

Government’s atrocious record in terms of protecting IT systems and the personal data privacy of individuals: The Government of Barbados DOES NOT have the resources (people, processes, or technologies) to secure complex IT systems and provide consistent privacy-enabling solutions. If they did, there would not be so many successful cyber-attacks and data breaches of government online systems in recent years (e.g., Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Ministry of Information and Smart Technology, Immigration Department, Barbados Police Service, and many others). Until government invests significantly in building their capacity in these areas, their IT systems and the personal data of Barbadians will be AT RISK.

The communication (or lack of) by government addressing the public angst around their digital ID program: Government has not effectively articulated the benefits of digital ID, its value to the average person on the street (in real and meaningful terms), its potential disadvantages and risks, what they are doing to manage these risks, and what Barbadians can do to protect themselves. Instead they have chosen to evade questions, avoid public discussion with experts involved, and turn their resources towards attacking private citizens who are expressing concerns.

In 2018, I conducted a European Union (EU) cybersecurity assessment for the the Government of Barbados. In the report, I clearly stated:

Trust in the Internet and in the use of online services is critical to developing a thriving local Internet economy and to participating widely in the global digital economy. Low trust in the Internet, e-government services, and e-commerce services hampers the government, businesses and consumers from fully taking advantage of all the economic benefits the Internet has to offer. Given the high fixed broadband and mobile data penetration rates in Barbados, this is especially concerning.

European Union Consultancy to Develop a Government Cybersecurity Assessment and Strategic Roadmap – Cybersecurity Assessment Report (Authored by Niel Harper)

From 2018 to this present day, the government has failed to address the low levels of trust or their lack of expertise in delivering secure and privacy respecting IT solutions, all of which are undoubtedly preventing them from delivering their digital transformation and modernisation agenda (including the implementation of the digital ID).

Ultimately, Barbadians need to decide for themselves if the value of obtaining the Trident ID outweighs the associated risks. I cannot make this decision for anyone. All I can do is educate and build awareness, and try to put some pressure on the government to be more accountable and take greater responsibility for protecting citizens from the negative effects of digital ID, mass personal data processing, cyber attacks and data breaches, human rights violations, online fraud, and other harms resulting from widespread government use of information and communication technologies (ICTs).

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

FACT CHECK: The Electoral and Boundaries Commission’s Response

Why the Barbados Election Least Data Leak is Problematic – And How It Could Have Been Prevented

Comments on the National Identity Management System Act

Too Many Unanswered Questions: The Barbados National Digital Identification

Creating a good ID system presents risks and challenges, but there are common success factors

What is a digital identity ecosystem?

Understanding the risks of Digital IDs

Why the Barbados Election List Data Leak is Problematic – And How it Could Have Been Prevented

nielharper

On 27 December 2021, the Prime Minister of Barbados Mia Amor Mottley scheduled a snap election for 19 January 2022.

On 29 December 2021, a full data dump of all eligible voters in the country was published by the Government of Barbados on the open Internet. This occurred largely because the Representation of the People Act 13(1) states “The [Electoral] Commission shall cause to be prepared and shall publish not later than the 31st day of January in every year a register of electors for each constituency and a register of foreign service electors entitled to vote at any election.” 

In the past, this list was made available in somewhat controlled environments to be queried by election officials, candidates, voters, etc. to ensure that elections accurately reflected the will of the people (in most all cases it was usually printed and held at libraries, constituency offices, polling stations, etc. to be reviewed by interested parties). To limit congregation of individuals in the previously mentioned locations during COVID-19 times, it was decided to publish the full voters list on the Internet to ensure access for all.

The 5250-page list contains approximately 250,000 individual records with the below personally identifiable information (PII). *

  • Last Name
  • First Name
  • National Registration Number (similar to a Social Security Number in the United States)
  • Gender
  • Date of Birth
  • Residential Status
  • Constituency (Voting District)
  • Home Address

* The total population of Barbados currently hovers around 290,000 persons.

Instead of this data being restricted to a few thousand persons in Barbados, it was now accessible by all 4.6 billion Internet users, exposing 250,000 Barbadians to increased risks of data misuse and abuse, fraud, identity theft, and other financial and reputation risks. The information was quickly downloaded and posted on Reddit and a number of hacker/fraudster sites on the Dark Web, making it perpetually available to malicious actors. There is also a high physical risk to individuals with regards to stalking, home invasions, robberies, rape, etc.

PII, also referred to as personal data, covers a wide variety of information that can identify a living individual. If a piece of information is unique to that person, it can lead back to them in several ways, and it is private and needs to be protected with the greatest care.

Why Does Personal Data Need to be Kept Safe?

The reason this type of information requires protection is that it can be used to commit fraud or to steal an individual’s identity.

Depending on what a thief is trying to accomplish, he will need different types of information. To open specific accounts all that is needed is an email address, while in other cases an individual’s name, address, date of birth, a national registration number, and other information may be required.

It’s also critical to note that accounts of all types can be opened over the phone or via the internet without having to physically visit a location for your identity to be verified. This provides opportunities for criminals with appropriate stolen information to open bank accounts, enter into contractual agreements, or make claims using someone else’s information or identity.

If a criminal is fraudulently using your information, you might not even know it. They may not use the credit card you already own to make purchases (in which case you might catch them by looking at your purchase history). Most often, criminals open up new, separate accounts using the victim’s information, leaving the victim unaware of the damage that is being done until years after the fact. In that time criminals can rack up a lot of debt using your identity.

How Can Identity Thieves Use Your Personal Data?

There are several ways which identity thieves can use your personal data, including but not limited to the following:

  • Open a new credit card account.
  • Create fake social media accounts with your identity (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.).
  • Take out a commercial bank loan.
  • Obtain and use your debit card to withdraw funds.
  • Change your billing address so your bills will no longer be delivered.
  • Obtain expensive medical care or procedures.
  • Open new utilities accounts in your name (e.g. electricity, water, natural gas, etc.).
  • Obtain a mobile phone service.
  • Open a bank account, obtain a cheque book, and write bad checks.
  • Obtain a new driver’s license or national ID.
  • Use your information when arrested or in a court action.
  • Engage in bullying, stalking, harassment or otherwise cause fear.
  • Inflict severe reputation damage.
  • Combine it with additional data gathered from the Internet (e.g., Google search, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc.) to create even more detailed profiles of individuals.

How Long Does It Take Fraudsters to Use Stolen Personal Data?

In 2017, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the United States demonstrated how criminals can use your personal information within minutes. The FTC developed fake personal data and posted it on a website that hackers use to make stolen information available. It took a mere nine (9) minutes for the fraudsters to access the information, and over 1,200 attempts were made to access email, credit card and payment accounts. The research confirms how valuable personal information is to identity thieves, and if they can gain access to it, they will most definitely use it.

What Should the Government Have Done Instead?

While it’s not an exhaustive list, below are some of the key steps the government should have taken.

From a technology perspective, a searchable database should have been published on the Government Information Service (GIS) portal, where individuals could use personal data which they already knew to confirm that they were on the voters list. The full database could have been provided to election officials and campaign managers using a digital rights management (DRM) solution to control access and distribution of the document. 

The Data Protection Act was approved by Parliament in July 2019 and came into force in March 2021. This statute introduces a strong privacy and data protection regime in Barbados, and its wide-reaching impact on overall data governance across sectors and industries should have triggered key updates to existing legislation, processes and operational guidelines (including the Representation of the People Act and any other legislation involving personal data processing). And this doesn’t even address the urgent need for broader legislative reforms in the country. There are way too many outdated pieces of legislation which are incompatible with progressive changes in technology, changing community awareness, changing community values, and changing expectations of the legal system.

Appropriate funding should be allocated to the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner to better equip them in investigating and monitoring data breaches and providing other types of regulation involving the public sector. Additionally, these financial resources can be used to deliver privacy awareness training to educate government personnel on how to protect individual privacy in their daily work. Simultaneously, a public campaign should be started to achieve broad public awareness on all issues related to the Data Protection Act and the new legal framework created. The Office of the Data Protection Commission is severely under-resourced at present, making it virtually impossible to implement and enforce the Data Protection Act, which focuses largely on preventing exactly these types of data leakages. For example, adhering to the principle of data minimisation would have significantly reduced the risk and impact of publishing the entire voters list. By this I mean the narrowing of data collection and processing to strictly what is needed – In this case, there is absolutely no reason to publicly release the National Registration Number (NRN) and Date of Birth of all eligible voters.

Why the Electoral and Boundaries Commission (EBC) is Dead Wrong

The Electoral and Boundaries Commission (EBC) has strongly (and wrongly might I add) defended its decision to publish the voters list online. Their position is that “We are obligated to publish the list now electronically so that more people can have access to it.” Chairman of the EBC Queen’s Counsel Leslie Haynes also maintains that “ID numbers are not private” and made reference to them “being published before the introduction of the digital age in public libraries, rum shops, the electoral office and other spaces.” Because a law states that you must publish information electronically doesn’t mean you should make it accessible to 4.6 billion Internet users (including hackers, fraudsters and other cyber criminals). There are numerous laws in Barbados that are outdated, poorly drafted, contradictory to other laws, and incompatible with existing technology – Should we follow them all to the letter or do we comprehensively update them to be more fit for purpose? Moreover, there are numerous technology solutions available for publishing said data online in a controlled manner to reduce the overall risk and exposure. And if they are not at fault, why did government officials remove the voters list from the public websites?

Finally, national registration number (NRN), date of birth (DOB) and home address are all private information, and there are established technical standards, privacy principles, and national laws or treaties around the globe that assert as much. From a data minimisation perspective, the requirements of the law could have been satisfied without including NRN and DOB.

Where online can you find the social security numbers (SSNs) for all eligible voting Americans? What about the passport numbers or driver’s license numbers for all voting Canadians? What about the national ID numbers for all voters in France, Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, etc.? The answer is NOWHERE!

[UPDATE] Sunday, 2 January 2022 – I have amended the original blog post in response to the EBC’s staunch defence of their decision to publish the voters list on the open Internet.

CARICOM Public Law Podcast – Cybersecurity and Digital IDs

nielharper

Season 1 Episode 8 of the CARICOM Public Law Podcast is now available!

In this episode of the podcast, I spoke to the hosts about the technological, legal, ethical, economic, and business issues surrounding the Barbados government’s decision to introduce a new digital identification management system.

Special thanks to Rico J. Yearwood and Mequissa Baptiste for inviting me to share my perspectives on their platform.

Click on this link to tune in and listen!

Comments on the Barbados National Identity Management Systems Act (2021)

nielharper

Dr. Ronnie Yearwood and Niel Harper recently collaborated to provide expert comments on the National Identity Management System Act (2021) just passed by the Government of Barbados. Given that this piece of legislation was quickly passed with no opportunities for public debate or feedback, we felt it necessary to articulate and ventilate some of our key concerns with the statute in its current form.

GENERAL COMMENTS

Disability and Accessibility

  • In line with the obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, there are no provisions in the Act for mandatory accessibility features in the digital ID and related services. As such, persons with disabilities may be excluded.

Oversight and Liability

  • There is no mention of a supervisory and oversight body that ensures the digital ID system is used for its intended purposes (to prevent abuse and misuse), to audit and certify the digital ID provider and third-party trust services, to address complaints, and ultimately provide redress.
  • There is no mention of the liability to be assumed by the government or trust services providers to ensure due diligence, transparency and accountability of their operations and services related to the digital ID. The digital ID service provider (Government) and trust services providers should be liable for damage caused to any natural or legal person due to failure to implement robust privacy and security controls or otherwise disadvantage individuals via the delivery of the digital ID system.

Breach notification

  • The Act does not speak to data breach notification and the relationship between this statute and the Data Protection Act (2019) which is critically important.  Furthermore, the Office of the Data Commissioner does not have the staffing or capabilities to oversee the various activities related to large scale data collection and processing.

Comprehensive digital ID ecosystem

  • The Act does not comprehensively cover electronic signatures, electronic seals, time stamps, electronic documents, and website authentication. The legal effect of the above needs to be clearly defined to avoid confusion. Existing practices, standards and legislation exist that can be built upon to address these matters which are integral to a functional digital ID system. Without those features, the Government will essentially be replacing the existing physical ID cards and not truly realizing the value of a digital ID ecosystem that delivers identity, authentication and trust services.

Interoperability

  • The Act does not speak to an interoperability framework that guarantees the digital ID system is built using open standards and can be seamlessly integrated into national and cross-border digital identity ecosystems.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

Discrimination and equality before the law

Section 5 (9) “A person who is a visitor shall not be eligible for registration in the National Register unless that person is a person to whom subsection (1) applies.”

(Section 5(1) covers persons, for example born in Barbados or citizens of Barbados who “shall be registered in the National Register.”)

  • The point is that a person who is a visitor to Barbados shall not be eligible for registration in the National Register unless section 5(1) applies.
  • Is it that only Barbadians and persons resident in Barbados must register to gain access to public services (see section 5(10)) regarding the fact that if you are not registered under the Act you cannot get a national registration number, cannot be added to the electoral register to vote, cannot obtain a permit to drive, or qualify to access any goods or services requiring presentation of the ID?
  • This looks somewhat discriminatory because the same requirement does not seem to be placed on foreigners for any access to services. I have not seen a reason for this proposed by the government.

(Also see section 12(1) reads: “A person who is issued an identification card may be required to produce his identification card (c) for the purpose of voting in an election in Barbados; (d) for the purpose of accessing goods or services provided by the Government or the private sector… and that identification card shall be prima facie evidence of the identity of the person shown on the identification card…”)

Voter’s rights, registration and identification

Section 5(10)(d) “A person who is not registered under this Act shall not qualify to be added to the register of electors or the revised register of electors prepared under the Representation of the People Act, Cap. 12”

Section 34(1) “An identification card authorised under section 25 of the Representation of the People Act, Cap. 12 or under the Statistics Act, Cap. 192 shall remain valid for a period of 12 months from the date of the commencement of this Act.”

  • Therefore, section 34(1) provides that an ID card under the Representation of the People Act shall only remain valid for 12 months from the commencement of the new ID law. When has the Act been commenced?

Section 12(1)(c) “A person who is issued an identification card may be required to produce his identification card for the purpose of voting in an election in Barbados.”

  • This needs clarification as there should be more than one valid piece of identification to enable voters’ rights […]

To read the entire comments document, please click on this link.

You can also find a full copy of the ‘Barbados Identity Management Act’ here.

Too Many Unanswered Questions: The Barbados National Digital Identification (DID)

nielharper

In September 2020, it was widely publicised that the Government of Barbados would be introducing a national digital identification (DID) card. As expected, the announcement and subsequent reports have included the usual public service rhetoric about shifting to a digital economy, delivering social benefits, increasing the efficiency of doing business, and transforming the country into an innovation hub. Putting this flowery political language aside, there are a number of questions that remain unanswered regarding the delivery of the DID project. Questions around clear policy objectives, economic value capture, social impact, technology standards and legal requirements that need to be addressed if Barbadians at-large are to truly profit from this initiative.

To be fair, a DID system represents innumerable benefits to the nation. It will serve as a key foundational element in transitioning to more accurate and efficient online delivery of government services (e-government), enhancing poverty alleviation and welfare services, reducing fraud, increasing financial inclusion, and serving national security interests.

However, without proper implementation, oversight and control, DID can inflict great harm on society, including the government or corporations profiting from the collection and storage of personal data, political manipulation of the electorate, social control of particular groups through surveillance, and restriction of access to uses such as payments, travel, and social media. Additionally, in the absence of a qualified and experienced project management team, it will most definitely be a ‘white elephant’ – a massive waste of public funds that does precious little to improve the lives of citizens. In the ensuing sections, I will provide a detailed analysis of critical risk areas that pertain to digital ID systems and what must be done to successfully alleviate them. 

To read the full article, please click on this link.