Feature Address at the AFRALTI ‘Child Online Protection (COP) Virtual Workshop’

It was my distinct pleasure to be the featured speaker at today’s opening of AFRALTI’s ‘Child Online Protection (COP) Virtual Workshop.’

My presentation briefly touched on the importance of the following activities:

  1. Bringing multiple stakeholders together to create a safe and empowering online experience for children and young people
  2. Educating parents and educators to keep children safe online
  3. Ensuring that policymakers elaborate a legal framework that is adaptive, inclusive, and fit for purpose with regards to a fast-changing digital age to protect children online
  4. Ensuring that ICT and online industries understand their shared responsibility for securing cyberspace and commit to action

Based in Nairobi (Kenya), African Advanced Level Telecommunications Institute (AFRALTI) is an Inter-Governmental Institute established in 1991 to supplement and spearhead ICT development efforts mainly in English-speaking Africa. Currently the member States that have ratified the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) include Lesotho, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Kingdom of Eswatini, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, out of the 23 eligible members.

Incoming ISACA Board Features Experienced Leaders, Diverse Backgrounds

Deeply humbled to have been elected to the incoming Board of Directors for the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA).

The organisation has been instrumental in my career development and success, and I am looking forward to collaborating with this brilliant group of professionals and serving the dynamic and diverse ISACA community.

You can view the official announcement here: https://bit.ly/2QkW5S6

Comments on the National Identity Management Systems Act (2021)

Dr. Ronnie Yearwood and Niel Harper recently collaborated to provide expert comments on the National Identity Management System Act (2021) just passed by the Government of Barbados. Given that this piece of legislation was quickly passed with no opportunities for public debate or feedback, we felt it necessary to articulate and ventilate some of our key concerns with the statute in its current form.


Disability and Accessibility

  • In line with the obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, there are no provisions in the Act for mandatory accessibility features in the digital ID and related services. As such, persons with disabilities may be excluded.

Oversight and Liability

  • There is no mention of a supervisory and oversight body that ensures the digital ID system is used for its intended purposes (to prevent abuse and misuse), to audit and certify the digital ID provider and third-party trust services, to address complaints, and ultimately provide redress.
  • There is no mention of the liability to be assumed by the government or trust services providers to ensure due diligence, transparency and accountability of their operations and services related to the digital ID. The digital ID service provider (Government) and trust services providers should be liable for damage caused to any natural or legal person due to failure to implement robust privacy and security controls or otherwise disadvantage individuals via the delivery of the digital ID system.

Breach notification

  • The Act does not speak to data breach notification and the relationship between this statute and the Data Protection Act (2019) which is critically important.  Furthermore, the Office of the Data Commissioner does not have the staffing or capabilities to oversee the various activities related to large scale data collection and processing.

Comprehensive digital ID ecosystem

  • The Act does not comprehensively cover electronic signatures, electronic seals, time stamps, electronic documents, and website authentication. The legal effect of the above needs to be clearly defined to avoid confusion. Existing practices, standards and legislation exist that can be built upon to address these matters which are integral to a functional digital ID system. Without those features, the Government will essentially be replacing the existing physical ID cards and not truly realizing the value of a digital ID ecosystem that delivers identity, authentication and trust services.


  • The Act does not speak to an interoperability framework that guarantees the digital ID system is built using open standards and can be seamlessly integrated into national and cross-border digital identity ecosystems.


Discrimination and equality before the law

Section 5 (9) “A person who is a visitor shall not be eligible for registration in the National Register unless that person is a person to whom subsection (1) applies.

(Section 5(1) covers persons, for example born in Barbados or citizens of Barbados who “shall be registered in the National Register.”)

  • The point is that a person who is a visitor to Barbados shall not be eligible for registration in the National Register unless section 5(1) applies.
  • Is it that only Barbadians and persons resident in Barbados must register to gain access to public services (see section 5(10)) regarding the fact that if you are not registered under the Act you cannot get a national registration number, cannot be added to the electoral register to vote, cannot obtain a permit to drive, or qualify to access any goods or services requiring presentation of the ID?
  • This looks somewhat discriminatory because the same requirement does not seem to be placed on foreigners for any access to services. I have not seen a reason for this proposed by the government.

(Also see section 12(1) reads: “A person who is issued an identification card may be required to produce his identification card (c) for the purpose of voting in an election in Barbados; (d) for the purpose of accessing goods or services provided by the Government or the private sector… and that identification card shall be prima facie evidence of the identity of the person shown on the identification card…”)

Voter’s rights, registration and identification

Section 5(10)(d) “A person who is not registered under this Act shall not qualify to be added to the register of electors or the revised register of electors prepared under the Representation of the People Act, Cap. 12

Section 34(1) An identification card authorised under section 25 of the Representation of the People Act, Cap. 12 or under the Statistics Act, Cap. 192 shall remain valid for a period of 12 months from the date of the commencement of this Act.

  • Therefore, section 34(1) provides that an ID card under the Representation of the People Act shall only remain valid for 12 months from the commencement of the new ID law. When has the Act been commenced?

Section 12(1)(c) “A person who is issued an identification card may be required to produce his identification card for the purpose of voting in an election in Barbados.”

  • This needs clarification as there should be more than one valid piece of identification to enable voters’ rights.

Section 12(2) “Where a person is unable to produce his identification card for the purposes mentioned in subsection (1), the person authorised to require such identification shall, unless another form of identification is authorised by law, defer consideration of the person or refuse access until such time as the relevant identification card is produced.”

  • This does not appear to make sense because what other forms of ID are relevant if every other ID is being subsumed by the digital ID based on the Government’s argument that the digital ID is to prevent fraud and bring efficiency in one form of ID.
  • In the alternative if we consider that other forms of ID can be considered as noted in the law, it is not stated what these forms of ID are and section 5(10) it states that a person not registered under the law shall not, “qualify to access any service or goods which require the presentation of an identification card to obtain such services or goods.” So, in effect the digital ID becomes the only way to access public services.
  • Overall, sections 12 (1) and 12 (2) links the provision of universal public services to the digital ID and denial of such services for failure to produce the digital ID. Section 18 also links the ID to access of public services.
  • If the point of the digital ID is to confirm a person is who they are to access the service, then how it is rational to exclude other forms of ID, while someone is denied access to vital public services, (which we assume to be health, welfare, education as the Act does not define or specify these services).
  • Section 12 does not define these goods and services.
  • Is section 12(d) proportionate? Does it achieve what Government claims the law should address, i.e., identity theft? However, what identity theft occurs if someone presents themselves for universal public services such as medical treatment or other related public services?
  • Can the Government realistically transition the entire population off the existing ID cards in 12 months? What contingencies are in place if this is not achieved? Most importantly, this appears to suggest that after 12 months the only valid form of identification to vote will be the digital ID card. Can this lead to voter disenfranchisement and violation of the individual’s constitutional rights? Should not other forms of identification such as a verified passport or driver’s license be satisfactory to allow an individual to vote?

Driver’s licence

5(10)(e) “A person who is not registered under this Act shall not (e) qualify to obtain a driver’s permit or licence”

  • Is this disproportionate, and could harm chances for employment as well as affect mobility?  What is the justification?

Access to Goods and services

5(10)(f) “A person who is not registered under this Act shall not qualify to access any service or goods which require the presentation of an identification card to obtain such services or goods.”

  • This is exclusionary in nature and also does not take into consideration that other forms of identification are valid.
  • Also, there is no definition of goods and services.

Fingerprinting – Optional, as a “refusal”

Section 7(5) Where a person refuses to consent to submitting fingerprints, that refusal shall be indicated in the applicable field set out for that purpose in the National Register

(a) by affixing his name, signature or mark; or

(b) where a person is unable to affix his name, signature or mark the registering officer shall indicate on the Certificate of Registration that the person is unable to sign,

and the person shall not be subject to any penalty, fine or term of imprisonment.

  • Fingerprinting is framed as a “refusal” which is indicated in the Register as some sort of mark against a person for not wanting to have their fingerprints taken, and in that the individual is not subject to penalty. However, how is it an individual would be subject to penalty for something that is optional?

Privacy & Security

Section 19(1) “The Commission shall ensure the security and confidentiality of the records of a person registered.”

Section 19(2) Commission shall take measures including security safeguards to ensure that the information in the possession or control of the Commission, including information recorded in the National Register or embedded in the chip of the identification card or the national identity credential, is secured and protected against any loss, unauthorised access or use or unauthorised disclosure thereof.

  • These sections need more robustness. Evaluation of security and privacy controls should be based on international standards. It should not be left up to the Commission to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of the controls around security and privacy. Standards such as ISO 15408, ISO 27001, ISO 27701, and others are worthwhile mentioning.

Data disclosure

Section 20(1)

A Commissioner, an officer or an employee of the Commission or an expert retained to assist the Commission shall comply with the provisions of the Data Protection Act, 2019 (Act 2019-29) and shall keep confidential all information coming to his knowledge during the performance of his functions under this Act or any enactment which relates to the private affairs of a person except insofar as disclosure is necessary for

(a) the administration of this Act or any regulations made thereunder;

(b) compliance with the provisions of any enactment; or

(c) compliance with an order of a court.

  • Data can be disclosed not only to a Commissioner but to an officer or an employee of the Commission overseeing the register, or an expert retained by the Commission. An individual’s information can be disclosed to a third party. This is in the administration and compliance with the law, and compliance with a court order. But how does an individual challenge such disclosure or have a right to be heard on the disclosure? Is the individual made aware? What about issues of privacy and procedural fairness?
  • What about obtaining informed consent from data subjects if their information is being shared with a third-party? This is in contradiction with the Data Protection Act and other global data protection laws such as GDPR (EU), CCPA (California), PIPA (Canada), and others.

Section 22(1) A person who is aggrieved by an act performed or a decision made by the Commission may make a complaint to the Data Protection Commissioner within 14 days of the act performed or the decision made by the Commission.”

  • The Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Office of the Data Protection Commissioner are both Government entities. Adequate oversight for the digital ID system cannot be achieved with this insufficient segregation of authority. There should be a collegial body in place to oversee this critical function. The body should consist of representatives from the government, private sector, academia, technical community, and civil society, with power vested equally to each member.
  • The complaints provision in section 22(1) does not appear to make sense in connection with section 20(1) on disclosure, if it is not clear that an individual or data subject does not know that their information was disclosed to a Commissioner or a third-party.

Section 23 “A person who is aggrieved by the decision of the Data Protection Commissioner pursuant to section 22 shall appeal to the High Court within 14 days of the decision.”

  • Processes for efficient redress in the High Court are not in place. This should be performed by an independent arbitration body with sufficient authority. The High Court is not the venue for dispute resolution (arbitration), and this should be addressed in the Act in a clear manner.


Section 26(a-i)

  • This appears to be currently addressed in the Computer Misuse Act 2005. Why not just refer back to this statute as opposed to creating offence/sentencing fragmentation?
  • The Act imposes a fine of $100,000 and/or 3 years in jail and the Computer Misuse Act imposes a fine of $50,000 and/or 5 years in jail for basically the same crime.

Sections 27 and 28.  Same as above.

Data minimisation

  • First Sch, number 25 “Other relevant information required by the Commission”

This appears to point to mission or data creep, so that different kinds of information can be added and centralized, but where is the consultation/oversight for this broad category?

Too Many Unanswered Questions: The Barbados National Digital Identification (DID)

In September 2020, it was widely publicised that the Government of Barbados would be introducing a national digital identification (DID) card. As expected, the announcement and subsequent reports have included the usual public service rhetoric about shifting to a digital economy, delivering social benefits, increasing the efficiency of doing business, and transforming the country into an innovation hub. Putting this flowery political language aside, there are a number of questions that remain unanswered regarding the delivery of the DID project. Questions around clear policy objectives, economic value capture, social impact, technology standards and legal requirements that need to be addressed if Barbadians at-large are to truly profit from this initiative.

To be fair, a DID system represents innumerable benefits to the nation. It will serve as a key foundational element in transitioning to more accurate and efficient online delivery of government services (e-government), enhancing poverty alleviation and welfare services, reducing fraud, increasing financial inclusion, and serving national security interests.

However, without proper implementation, oversight and control, DID can inflict great harm on society, including the government or corporations profiting from the collection and storage of personal data, political manipulation of the electorate, social control of particular groups through surveillance, and restriction of access to uses such as payments, travel, and social media. Additionally, in the absence of a qualified and experienced project management team, it will most definitely be a ‘white elephant’ – a massive waste of public funds that does precious little to improve the lives of citizens. In the ensuing sections, I will provide a detailed analysis of critical risk areas that pertain to digital ID systems and what must be done to successfully alleviate them. 

To read the full article, please click on this link.

2021 ISACA Technology for Humanity Award

I have been selected as the recipient of the 2021 ISACA Technology for Humanity Award, with the citation:

“For contributions to capacity building across the world towards the development of affordable, open and user-centric Internet infrastructure.”

Since 2010, I have worked with organizations such as the Internet Society, Internet Engineering Task Force, Branson Centre for Entrepreneurship, United Nations, TEN Habitat, Google, NBCUniversal, IETF, European Commission, and others to lead, implement and/or support capacity building programs towards the implementation of open, affordable, secure and user-centric Internet infrastructure and applications in Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America & the Caribbean, and Europe.

This award recognises these contributions.

Hearty congratulations to all of the 2021 ISACA Global Achievements Award recipients!!!!

Blockchain Framework and Guidance

The Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) just released the ‘Blockchain Framework and Guidance’ publication.

“Blockchain Framework and Guidance provides an overview of blockchain, including history, types, benefits, features, concepts and use cases, and offers a framework for the adoption of blockchain technology across enterprises. The ISACA blockchain framework provides foundational information, practical guidance and proposed tools for proper blockchain implementation, governance, security, audit and assurance. The unique aspects of blockchain technology and the blockchain touchpoints with existing technology ecosystems are explained in detail. In addition, Blockchain Framework and Guidance maps existing technology implementation disciplines into the process of blockchain adoption.”

As a member of ISACA’s Emerging Technology Advisory Group, I served as an Expert Reviewer of this document.

You can access this excellent resource through ISACA’s Bookstore.

Why Linux is the Most Popular Operating System

If you engage in a discussion with the average IT professional about which operating system is the most popular, you will more than likely hear claims that Windows has more than a 75% market share. I argue that this is the furthest thing from the truth, and I will explain why below.

Linux operating systems are widely used in numerous software applications. From large scale social media platforms to gaming consoles to popular coding languages, it’s hard to avoid the use of Linux anywhere on the Internet. The integration of IoT, embedded systems and robotics in Linux has driven innovation across several industry verticals and is also fuelling increased market growth. Moreover, the availability of numerous open source codes and products will generate wider adoption across the world. The ongoing efforts taking place to replace conventional operating systems in the IT and telecom sectors with Linux-based systems has opened up massive growth potential for the overall market in the coming years. The increasing adoption of these systems in enterprise data centres and the explosion of data centre build-outs will have a huge impact on the growth of the market in the foreseeable future. But why is Linux so popular?


What makes Linux attractive is the free and open source software (FOSS) licensing model. One of the most attractive elements offered by the OS is its price – totally free. Users can download current versions of hundreds of distributions. Businesses can supplement the free price with a support service if needed. Either way, there is no new hardware required. Another Linux benefit is the availability to download and run thousands of free, fully functional applications. In many cases, the quality of the software is equal or superior to well-known Windows applications.


This is a debatable point, and where I think Linux triumphs is because of its community. As Linux’s popularity grew, so did the number of developers and users involved in evolving the codebase. This army of highly competent and dedicated individuals has spent and continues to spend countless hours discovering and quickly correcting bugs, while also improving the code. The massive community support is in my opinion what makes Linux more stable and reliable.


For the same reason underpinning its stability, Linux continues to be the most secure kernel currently running in production. When an exploit is discovered, it is immediately patched into the latest stable kernel and to all affected Long Term Supported (LTS) kernels. Taking cues from its UNIX predecessors, Linux was from the very beginning designed to be a multiuser operating system. This resulted in tighter permission and access controls for both users and applications. Consequently, attackers are pretty much disincentivized to write viruses or malware for the platform.


While Linux and the operating systems using the kernel are free, supporting those operating systems typically requires companies and end users to pay for support subscriptions. As such, they are guaranteed to get the latest software technologies, hardware support and security patches integrated into their environment and onto their physical or virtual machines. They can also take advantage of the availability of many talented developers across the globe who can support their deployments.

All that sounds nice, but who really uses Linux anyway?

  • Android is Linux-based (there are currently more than 2.5 billion Android devices, representing 85% of the mobile market and 40% of all devices connected to the Internet)
  • AWS, Azure, Google, Rackspace and others use Linux to deliver their cloud services
  • Linux is running on most resource constrained devices, including IoT hardware and Raspberry Pi boards
  • A large percentage of home Internet routers run Linux
  • Telco networks are largely Linux-based (e.g. AT&T, Verizon, Nippon Telephone & Telegraph, China Mobile, Vodafone, Telefonica, etc.)
  • Science-based organizations, particularly those running supercomputers, rely on Linux (e.g. NASA, CERN, NOAA, universities, etc.)
  • The defence industry uses Linux to run submarines, ground control systems, radar, aircraft carriers, warships, etc.
  • Countries like the US, China, North Korea, Germany, Estonia, Iceland, Spain, India, Brazil, etc. use Linux in multiple public sector applications, especially for education, law enforcement, military, and e-government
  • National e-voting systems across the world predominantly use Linux
  • Embedded control systems for power utilities, water companies, manufacturing, auto assembly, etc. all use Linux
  • Most global stock exchanges run on Linux
  • Most in-flight entertainment systems run on Linux
  • Sabre, the ubiquitous airline reservation system, runs on Linux
  • Connected car systems run on Linux
  • The most innovative software such as OpenStack, Docker, Juju, Kubernetes, etc. were all designed initially to support Linux
  • Linux supports 32-bit and 64-bit x86, ARM, MIPS, SPARC, POWER microprocessors – making it highly portable
  • Linux runs on many types of obscure and outdated hardware

And the list can go on and on…

What are your thoughts on Linux?

The Roles of Digital Currencies and Cryptocurrencies in Central Banks

The University of the West Indies – Cave Hill Campus presents an expert panel discussion on ‘Building Digital Economies: The Roles of Digital Currencies and Cryptocurrencies in Central Banks.’

The speakers will be yours truly, Dr. Justin Robinson, and Stephen Phillips. We will be exploring the use of digital currencies and cryptocurrencies in accelerating digital economies across the Caribbean regions.

Key topics to be discussed will include, but are not limited to, online payments, regulatory frameworks, legislative reform, financial inclusion, digital IDs, and other relevant areas.

Don’t miss it!

Cybersecurity: Risks, Progress and the Way Forward in Latin America & the Caribbean

I will be chairing this Global Cyber Forum on 21 October 2020, where we will be discussing the state of cybersecurity capacities and capabilities across the Caribbean region.

Our speaker will be Kerry-Ann Barrett, Cybersecurity Policy Specialist at the Organization of American States (OAS), where she offers technical assistance to Member States in the development and implementation of their national cyber security strategies as well as assists in the implementation of various technical projects with the OAS Cybersecurity Program.

The overall basis for the session will be the 2020 Cybersecurity Report prepared by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Organization of American States (OAS), and the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, University of Oxford. Our discussions will focus on the progress made thus far across the Caribbean, and what steps are necessary to move to the next level, including key areas such as national cybersecurity strategies, related action plans, or other cybersecurity capacity-building programs.

Tune in for what will be an engaging and informative session!

The Cost of 1GB of Mobile Data: Why It Matters!

While not the only barrier to access, the high cost of data is the biggest factor keeping people offline. Undoubtedly, those countries/regions with the least affordable data are also those with the fewest people connected to the Internet. A failure to deliver affordable Internet access keeps citizens offline and compounds global inequalities.

From a personal perspective, I have complained bitterly over the years about the cost of mobile data in my country Barbados and how it negatively impacts economic growth and the effective transition to a digital economy. Based on available statistics, the cost of 1 GB of mobile data in Barbados is USD$9.32 (ranked 196th globally).

In comparison, below are the prices/rankings for a sample of other countries:

>> India: $0.09 (1st)
>> Somalia: $0.50 (7th)
>> Russian Federation: $0.52 (9th)
>> China: $0.61 (12th)
>> Denmark: $0.80 (29th)
>> Brazil: $1.01 (38th)
>> United Kingdom: $1.39 (59th)
>> Hong Kong: $2.55 (101st)
>> United Arab Emirates: $3.78 (130th)
>> Jamaica: $3.88 (138th)
>> United States: $8.00 (188th)
>> Canada: $12.55 (209th)
>> Cuba: $13.33 (212th)
>> Bermuda: $28.75 (225th)

High mobile data costs also have a negative knock-on effect on the diffusion of existing and emerging technologies and applications (e.g. IoT, smart cities, telemedicine, mobile payments, etc.), many of them with high social benefits.

Do you know where your country ranks? What do you think of these statistics?