AI didn’t leave the door open. It just got blamed for it.

I believe that AI is a convenient ‘scapegoat’ for systemic issues across the tech landscape. And here’s why…

▪ Governance of cybersecurity and AI is thin. IBM’s 2025 breach study and the 2025 Marsh Cyber Risk Intelligence Center report both establish that organizations with weak governance and oversight controls tend to be breached more often and pay the most. In my experience, a poor tone from the top is the biggest reason for cybersecurity failures.

▪ Many companies, even the large and well-resourced ones, are simply doing bad security. The basics such as asset management, endpoint protection, configuration management, continuous vulnerability management, IAM, incident response, secure software development, third-party risk management, etc. are routinely ignored or poorly executed. Verizon’s 2026 report puts vulnerability exploitation at 31% of initial access, up from 20% and ahead of phishing and credential abuse. Remediation rates have also worsened.

▪ Software is built for velocity, not secure by design. Agile development and automation aren’t the villains, but they’re key contributors if not done right. But shipping code without security gates is definitely the main culprit (and way too many companies are doing this). Veracode’s 2026 report analyzed 1.6 million applications. 82% of organizations carry security debt, up 11% on last year. Debt meaning known flaws left open for more than a year. 60% carry critical debt (severe, exploitable flaws unresolved for over a year), up 20% year on year.

▪ AI-generated code is fast, not safe. Veracode’s 2026 tests show AI-generated code passing security checks only 56% of the time, with no improvement. It’s also getting bloated and duplicated. Bloat enlarges the attack surface and hides flaws. Duplicated code is harder to audit and find vulnerabilities.

▪ AI agents aren’t going rogue. We’re giving them excessive permissions and autonomy and then not governing them. That’s a design and oversight failure, not Skynet-type science fiction. OWASP’s Excessive Agency risk names excessive functionality, permissions and autonomy as the root causes for agentic-related breaches.

▪ Regulation is lagging. Secure by design is voluntary, and the EU AI Act’s high-risk rules just slipped to 2027–28. Voluntary doesn’t work; it’s a market failure. Constantly delayed regulation is a problem because AI companies keep shipping more features and functionality in the gap (and thus the possibility for harm increases exponentially).

AI doesn’t create these weaknesses. It accelerates them, at machine speed.

The answer isn’t slower AI. It’s boards that own the risk, least privilege for agents, secure-by-default pipelines, and regulation that actually gets enforced.

Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) from code to cartel

Yesterday at Black Hat MEA, my first deep dive session of the day focused on “Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) from code to cartel”.

I was privileged to share the stage with Ira Winkler, Patricia Titus, and Bjørn R. Watne.

We explored the evolution of ransomware into today’s organized, profit-centered, multi-disciplinary threat collectives, and delved into some key areas such as:

  • The affililiate model and how ransomware groups function like legitimate companies
  • Recruitment for capabilities (e.g., exploit developers, cloud security engineering, C2 servers, payment portals, compromise of trusted insiders, etc.)
  • The importance of business resilience as a risk response (e.g., disaster recovery testing, incident response planning, ransomware playbooks, tabletop exercises)
  • How the transition from double extortion to triple extortion is also manifesting as threats of bodily harm and targeting of family members
  • Emphasized that cyber insurance is not a replacement for robust security controls (e.g., air-gapped backups, MFA, PAM, EDR, security awareness, etc.)
  • How critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and operational resilience legislation factor into the overall industry response (e.g., DORA, NIS 2, CRA, etc.)
  • Detailed why software developers and their tooling are increasingly targeted by RaaS consortiums due to risks such as privileged access to sensitive environments (staging, production), API and cloud infrastructure key custodianship, DevSecOps weaknesses, trust injection across CI/CD pipelines, code repository theft, etc.
  • Addressing encryption-related risks like quantum computing and cryptographic agility
  • How both defenders and attackers are leveraging AI

Many thanks to my fellow panelists for their brilliant insights and a note of appreciation for all those who attended.

Five Ways Security Professionals Can Start the New Year Strong

As we step into the new year, it’s crucial for cybersecurity professionals to gear up for a more secure future. Beyond just looking ahead, it’s essential to consider how our personal and professional efforts can enhance #DigitalTrust.

Thanks to ISACA for featuring my latest blog post that outlines five impactful ways to kickstart 2025 and sustain momentum throughout the year. Let’s make 2025 a milestone year for cybersecurity!

You can read the full article here: https://bit.ly/4j7qCfj