AI didn’t leave the door open. It just got blamed for it.

I believe that AI is a convenient ‘scapegoat’ for systemic issues across the tech landscape. And here’s why…

▪ Governance of cybersecurity and AI is thin. IBM’s 2025 breach study and the 2025 Marsh Cyber Risk Intelligence Center report both establish that organizations with weak governance and oversight controls tend to be breached more often and pay the most. In my experience, a poor tone from the top is the biggest reason for cybersecurity failures.

▪ Many companies, even the large and well-resourced ones, are simply doing bad security. The basics such as asset management, endpoint protection, configuration management, continuous vulnerability management, IAM, incident response, secure software development, third-party risk management, etc. are routinely ignored or poorly executed. Verizon’s 2026 report puts vulnerability exploitation at 31% of initial access, up from 20% and ahead of phishing and credential abuse. Remediation rates have also worsened.

▪ Software is built for velocity, not secure by design. Agile development and automation aren’t the villains, but they’re key contributors if not done right. But shipping code without security gates is definitely the main culprit (and way too many companies are doing this). Veracode’s 2026 report analyzed 1.6 million applications. 82% of organizations carry security debt, up 11% on last year. Debt meaning known flaws left open for more than a year. 60% carry critical debt (severe, exploitable flaws unresolved for over a year), up 20% year on year.

▪ AI-generated code is fast, not safe. Veracode’s 2026 tests show AI-generated code passing security checks only 56% of the time, with no improvement. It’s also getting bloated and duplicated. Bloat enlarges the attack surface and hides flaws. Duplicated code is harder to audit and find vulnerabilities.

▪ AI agents aren’t going rogue. We’re giving them excessive permissions and autonomy and then not governing them. That’s a design and oversight failure, not Skynet-type science fiction. OWASP’s Excessive Agency risk names excessive functionality, permissions and autonomy as the root causes for agentic-related breaches.

▪ Regulation is lagging. Secure by design is voluntary, and the EU AI Act’s high-risk rules just slipped to 2027–28. Voluntary doesn’t work; it’s a market failure. Constantly delayed regulation is a problem because AI companies keep shipping more features and functionality in the gap (and thus the possibility for harm increases exponentially).

AI doesn’t create these weaknesses. It accelerates them, at machine speed.

The answer isn’t slower AI. It’s boards that own the risk, least privilege for agents, secure-by-default pipelines, and regulation that actually gets enforced.

Is your biggest security risk already inside your castle?

I recently sat down with Mary K. Pratt (always wonderful to speak with her) to discuss “insider threats” for her CSO Online article.

My message was that the definition of an “insider” has fundamentally changed. It’s no longer just about disgruntled employees; it’s about a complex web of social engineering, digital savviness, and agentic AI.

Below are three critical takeaways from our discussion on “new” face of insider threats:

>> Social Media as a Recruitment Tool: Threat actors are using OSINT on social platforms to find “mercenaries”. By identifying employees under economic or personal pressure, they can bribe or blackmail insiders to do their dirty work.

>> The Rise of the “High-Risk” Average User: You don’t need to be a developer to be a threat. With modern digital tools and GenAI, the average staffer now has the capability to become a high-impact threat actor, intentionally or otherwise.

>> AI as the New Insider: We must start viewing AI agents as insiders. If an agent has privileged access and goes rogue — or is manipulated — it can exfiltrate data at machine speed. Essentially, AI has changed the paradigm of what constitutes an insider threat!

But what’s the solution? It’s time to move beyond “set and forget” background checks. Security pros must insist on regular, tiered background reinvestigations (especially for high-access roles), integrating behavioral signals with technical telemetry, and extending risk frameworks to include non-human/AI identities. In a world of remote work and outsourced contractors, trust must be continuous, not just a one-time onboarding event.

How is your organization adapting its Insider Risk Management framework for the AI era?

Check out the article here: https://lnkd.in/dkwhGMNE